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When something means something, it m e a n s t h a t t h e f i r s t something 
stands for the second something; that A is a carrier of the content B 
- or that A represents B. The following notes on how meaning has 
been structured from antiquity to the present are made on the basis 
of these assumptions: 
i) A stands for B; 
ii) when i), there is a relation between A and B; 
iii) when ii), there is meaning; 
iv) A * B. 
Tema SEMIOTIK 
Aliquid stat pro aliquo 
ACOMPREHENSIVE DEFINITION OF A SIGN is given by Umberto Eco who states that a sign is everything "— that can be used in 
order to lie". 1 But; he goes on to explain that i f 
something can not be used to tell a lie, i t can-
not be used to tell a truth either; in fact, he 
says, i f something cannot be used to tell a lie, it 
cannot be used to tell anything at all. 
The difference between aliquidand aliquo 
can be illustrated by a couple of children play-
ing in a sand pit. There is plenty of room, and 
plenty of spades. Still; they want to have the 
same spade, and sit on the same spot. To them 
there is no difference between spade, place and 
meaning. To have that spade and that place is 
to have the meaning — to be right. Inversely; 
not to have exactly that spade and not to sit on 
that particular spot means not to have the 
meaning - to be wrong. The dispute therefore 
becomes a matter of existential importance, o f 
life and death to the children. At this point 
there are two possibilities: either they have to 
fight it out, or an adult wi l l come along and 
introduce the difference whereby the negoti-
ation of meaning becomes possible by repre-
senting various combinations of spades and pla-
ces among the combatants. 
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As civilised grown ups we try to maintain and 
to cultivate this difference, and to us as scien-
tists i t "permits our hypotheses to die in our 
stead".2 There is hardly anything new in this. 
That A stands for B, is an insight as old as phi-
losophy itself. As a matter of fact this insight is 
at the very core of philosophy. I f A equaled B, 
i f something did not stand for something else, 
then something would be just — something, 
and there would be nothing to know or to 
think. There would be no philosophy, only 
t ru th , like Nietzsche and Heidegger would 
have it . 
The systematic and general study of the re-
lationship between aliquidand aliquo, in other 
words semiotics, is however considered a rela-
tively new discipline. Its relevance to architec-
ture is illustrated by the example o f the child-
ren in the sand pit. I n building their castles in 
the sand, they distribute spades, places and 
meaning in their common world, as we do in 
building ours. 
Antique Beginnings 
Semeion is the Greek term for sign. When we 
consider semiotics a new discipline, this is only 
right wi th in the given definition as a field of 
knowledge. The ancient Greeks studied signs. 
However; they distinguished between theory 
o f linguistic signs, and theory of signs in ge-
neral - like smoke being a sign of fire and red 
spots on the face being a sign of measles etc. 
Semeiotics in antiquity was the discipline which 
today is referred to as medical diagnostics. 
Pre-Aristotelian understanding of the linguis-
tic sign is synthesised in the Physeitbeory. Just 
like Semeiotics, the Physeitbeory claims a direct, 
causal relationship between the enunciated 
sound, the word, and its referent. This ap-
proach was probably brought to its peak of 
development in the etymology of Stoic philo-
sophy o f language. The Stoicists developed a 
structure of signification containing the three 
elements known to us from our own linguis-
tic theories of meaning: the sign, the signified 
and the real object. 
The sign or the word was considered to be a 
physical entity inasmuch as it existed through 
the voice. Both the word and the real object it 
referred to, were physical entities. The l ink bet-
ween them, the process of signification, or the 
emergence of meaning, was called Lekton, and 
passed through or rather, was established by the 
intellect. The meaning of the word and of the 
object were in other words both products o f 
the human intellect. Intellect, or reason {Logos) 
was thereby considered the source of meaning, 
and guaranteed the l ink between word and ob-
ject. See fig. I . 
W i t h i n this perspective the etymological 
project o f the Stoicists is understandable. Both 
sign and referent are understood to be control-
led by logos, and i t is up to the same logos to 
establish the claim of a causal relationship bet-
ween object and word to be true or untrue. I t is 
easy to see, especially in hindsight, the weak-
ness in the foundation of this theory. 
Aristotle 
Aristotle reformulated the three elements of 
the linguistic sign. He referred to the word or 
enunciation as the "Voice", VOX. He general-
ised the concept of object to signify the exter-
nal, material world, RES. And; finally, he ex-
changed the human intellect for an entity more 
closely related to his "General Concepts"; a 
table of kinds, a taxonomy, which he called 
SPECIES. Furthermore he introduced a direct 
relationship between the word, VOX, and the 
object, RES, in addition to the indirect rela-
tionship via SPECIES. The Aristotelian t r i -
angle (fig. 2), hence takes on a more general re-
levance than the construct o f the Stoicists. I n 
a certain sense it anticipates the semiotic t r i -
angle as we know it from Ch. S. Peirce. 
The triangle has now become a logical struc-
ture. I t interrelates not only the elements of the 
linguistic sign, but also the elements of phe-
nomenal meaning in general as according to 
Aristotle; FORM, GENERAI CONCEPT, and 
MATTER. Furthermore Aristotle characterises 
the interrelations between the elements of what 
we now can refer to as a Sign Structure. 
VOX relates to SPECIES by Significato. This 
means that the auditory form which is uttered, 
or expressed, in the enunciation is provided 
w i t h content by the GENERAL CONCEPT. 
When asked for its meaning, VOX points at 
SPECIES. Which content is related to which 
utterance, is however regulated by the inter-
relations o f VOX and SPECIES respectively 
wi th RES. The relationship between the sound 
"horse" and the general concept, the SPECIES 
/horse/ is regulated by the actual existence of a 
material horse - in RES. The direct interrela-
t ion between VOX and SPECIES, between 
form and concept, is in itself conventional and 
therefore arbitrary. 
O n the other hand; VOX is a form, and as 
such i t relates to RES like form relates to mat-
ter. The shape of a horse is the border and the 
result of its matter. Horse-form thus emerges 
from horse-matter. A n d inversely there is no 
such thing as horse-matter unless it is con-
tained in a horse-form. There is in other words 
a causal relation between the two, like bet-
ween smoke and fire. In the semiotic terms of 
Peirce, such a relation is called indexical. The 
interrelation between the word "horse", VOX, 
and the object horse, RES, is also indexical. 
Aristotle calls it Nominatio. Form and matter, 
like VOX and RES are in other words singular 
entities. 
General Concepts, on the other hand, are 
general. The general concept /horse/ is an emp-
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ty entity inasmuch as it does not refer ro any 
particular, real or actual horse, only to horses 
in general. The concept is however not com-
pletely neutral because they "resemble" their 
objects. Aristotle calls the interrelation bet-
ween SPECIES and RES Similitudo. Basically 
the GENERAL CONCEPTS relate to MATTER 
according to the same principle. 
FORM and MATTER are indivisible; as the 
examples o f horse-form, horse-matter, and 
smoke, fire, show us. The GENERAL C O N -
CEPT, however, evolves as a result o f our 
knowledge, or as the form that our general 
knowledge o f horses takes on. FORM, e.g. 
the horse-form, is directly connected w i t h the 
particular piece of MATTER, e. g. the horse-
matter, in question, whereas the GENERAL 
CONCEPT, the /horse/, wi l l comprise all hor-
ses - horse in general. 
Aristotle shows us a structure which reflects 
an integration of physics and meta-physics. 
The former rests in the direct VOX—RES re-
lation, and the latter is embedded in the more 
complex set o f VOX-SPECIES-RES inter-
relations. The relationship between an archi-
tect and his client/user can serve as an illustra-
t ion. I n the context of architectural produc-
t ion, the architect wi l l correspond to VOX. He 
carries out, enunciates or articulates the archi-
tecture. The client/user on the other side re-
presents content, function, economy, in short 
the matter, RES, which gives rise to, or init ia-
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tes the form that the architect eventually arti-
culates. The physical relationship between 
the architect and his client/user, now corre-
sponding to nominatio, is established by the 
building which is produced. However; any con-
tract for an architectural commission pre-
supposes a relationship between VOX and RES 
previous to construction; a relationship estab-
lished by means of general concepts. This level 
of the contact is established by meta-physical 
means — such as e. g. similitudo and signifi-
cato. According to Aristotle in his Metaphysics, 
architecture is a special blend of such elements, 
and he explains the special status that this gives 
the architect, or "master-artist": 
Inanimate things bring about the effects of 
their actions by some nature, while manual 
workers do so through habit which results 
by practising. Thus, master-artists are con-
sidered wiser not in virtue of their ability to 
do something but in virtue of having the 
theory and knowing the causes.3 
As can be expected, such claims were not met 
wi th unanimous consent. Jacques Le Goff re-
ports the heated dispute between architects 
and stone masons during the middle ages, 
about which were to be considered the masters 
of cathedral building. 4 The issue of their dis-
pute was exactly that addressed by Aristotle 
one and a half millennium earlier. 
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Figure 3. The Doctrine of Transsubstanciation. 
Medieval Transformations 
The most important medieval re-interpreta-
t ion o f Aristotle's logical structure is embed-
ded in the doctrine o f Transubstantiation. 
When Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) gave it the 
form in which we have come to know it (fig. 3), 
and in which it was adopted by the church as 
dogma in 1215. The problem of whether uni-
versal (Cf. Universal Concepts) did or did not 
exist had been the topic o f almost two cen-
turies o f learned discussion. In short, the doc-
trine of Transubstantiation claims that the 
bread and the wine which is offered at the 
Holy Communion does not represent, but is 
actually transformed into the flesh and blood 
of Christ. 
Aristotle suggested a structure of meaning 
where nominatio and significatio-similitudo 
were inherent aspects o f the sign. He did in 
other words claim that FORM, MATTER and 
GENERAL CONCEPT were indivisible, and 
that meaning as well as form and concept is 
basically inherent in matter. He was an abso-
lute materialist in this sense, and in De Inter-
pretatione Aristotle rejected all external deter-
minism. 
The fact that Thomas Aquinas could use the 
Aristotelian structure as basis for introducing 
G O D as an external source o f meaning, was be-
cause Aristotle had been studied and slightly re-
interpreted by Ptolemeus and other Arabian 
philosophers for the ten centuries he was for-
gotten in Europe. 
Through their reading of Aristotle's astro-
nomical works, the Arabs tended to under-
stand the influence of the celestial bodies on 
earth as an implicit emanation of form. This 
logic opened the Aristotelian structure so as to 
insert GOD, so to speak, between FORM and 
MATTER, and let h im replace the GENERAL 
CONCEPT. I n this way a turn towards the 
Stoicist, and Platonic for that matter, concep-
tion took place. It hence became possible for 
St. Thomas to claim that i f bread and wine 
tasted like bread and wine at the holy com-
munion, it was simply by coincidence. In fact, 
Thomas could then claim that, due to the in -
tervention of GOD, it is Jesus' flesh and blood 
which is presented to us at the holy commu-
nion - incidentally in the form of bread and 
wine. 
This corruption of Aristotle's logics resulted 
in the existence of two truths, which put rea-
son under a certain pressure. O n one hand 
there was the secular truth of bread and wine 
being jusr bread and wine. O n the other hand 
there was the clerical truth which claimed that 
bread and wine not represented - but actually 
were — Jesus' flesh and blood. A believer was 
thus in away, compelled to believe against bet-
ter judgement. 
This ambiguity became, as one would ex-
pect, a problem for philosophy; a problem 
which significant areas o f philosophy are still 
toi l ing wi th . We would nowadays recognise 
this problem as "the problem o f representa-
tion". 
Wi l l i am of Ockham (1284-1349) held that 
"The world is only given to us once". W i t h this 
dictum he erased not only SPECIES from the 
Aristotelian model, but he also abolished the 
basic semiotic categories significato, the sym-
bolic, and similitude/, the iconic. The maxim is 
rendered as "Ockham's Razor". 
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Figure 4. "Ockhams Razor".The only relation left bet-
ween expression and content is now the direct, un-
mediated and unregulated relation between signi-
fier and signified. This renders all meaning arbitrary. 
After this operation the general sign structure 
passed into oblivion for a few centuries. The 
modern, binary, linguistic sign on the other 
hand is considered to be initiated at that time. 
This is the origin of linguistic semiotics and 
the initiation of nominalism. 
O f course Ockham could not claim that ge-
neral concepts did not exist. Without them he 
couldn't even have forwarded such a claim. 
But; he insisted that they were absolutely neu-
tral or empty, and that they were independent 
of VOX and RES, of ACCIDENCES and SUB-
STANCES. As a substitute for the double struc-
ture of Aquinas, Ockham introduced the idea 
of an inner mental language, free from psycho-
logical or other mediations. So doing, he estab-
lished a binary interplay between syntagm and 
syntax, between VOX and SPECIES, FORM 
and CONCEPT. The sign bifurcates; Ockham 
argues: "Signum duplicatur accipitur...". 
This is the initiation o f another great phi-
losophical problem: the double nature o f the 
sign 5, which became the germ of the division 
between semiotics as linguistic theory (the 
French tradition of the binary sign), and se-
miotics as logic (the pragmatist tradition after 
Peirce). 
The external language, VOX - RES, has now 
been deprived o f its level o f reflection. I t is 
(species) 
CONCEPT 
inner 
language / 
/ 
ENUNCIATION 
(vox) 
EXPERIENCE M 
external 
language 
WORLD 
(res) 
Figure 5. The double nature of the sign when inter-
preted according to Ockham in one inner and one 
external language. Both become binary. 
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Figure 6. The Ambition (left): The inner language implodes into MIND, and the external is rendered isolated 
in WORLD. Descartes sets out to establish the cogitating SUBJECT as a firm ground for the relationship 
between the two. "Cogito ergo sum". 
The Outcome: The figure on the right illustrates the allegations against Descartes. Because of the weak-
ness of the relationship between MIND and WORLD, MIND is merged with SUBJECT, WORLD becomes OBJECT 
and the structure returns to an unstable SUBJECT-OBJECT dichotomy. 
struck by arbitrariness. The inner language, on 
the other hand, is left wi th only the concept 
and its enunciation. As this is a very weak basis 
for meaning, the result o f Ockham's cutting 
logic was that even the inner language was de-
stabilised. 
In order to remedy this problem however, 
Ockham introduced sentence and syntax. This 
made it possible to form systems of concepts 
that together constituted meaning. As simili-
tudo-or the iconical relation berween the con-
cept and the external world o f phenomena, 
RES - is abolished, the meaning hence con-
stituted could however only refer to itself. 
Modern Anticipations 
A benevolent reading of Descartes6 would see 
in his work an attempt at recovering a ground 
for meaning after Ockham's surgical opera-
tions. The absolute doubt is a methodological 
move, a rhetorical step, in which Descartes re-
flects the total instability of knowledge. In his 
" Cogito ergo sum" however, he sets out to install 
the subject as a third element of meaning. See 
fig. 6. It is generally assumed that Descartes did 
not succeed in this project. In fact he is, maybe 
unjustly, alleged as being mainly responsible 
for having driven the wedge in between subject 
and object, or in other terms between mind 
and world. 
The so called Modists, such as Spinoza and 
Locke, took particular interest in "The Inner 
Language", as differing from a philosophy of 
nature which would focus on the external 
world. They are called modists because of their 
special interest in the different ways that some-
thing can be; the modi o f things - as being, as 
thought and as enunciated or signifying. 
The modi as such are considered to be iso-
morphic. They concern VOX, SPECIES and 
RES alike. They are, after all, different modi of 
one and the same phenomenon. 
The decisive point in our perspective is that 
now the level o f signification {significato) in 
language could be analysed in itself, without 
considering its reference in RES. I n this man-
ner modism was able to study language as a fac-
tum. VOX and SPECIES could therefore be set 
as RES in their own right. O n this basis the 
modists were able to develop an autonomous 
linguistic science — resting on language as be-
ing, as thought and as enunciation w i t h i n i t -
self. 
We see in these operations a reference back 
to the Physistheory and Stoicist philosophy o f 
language as well as a certain attachment to the 
medieval Impositu Nominum7. There are also 
anticipations o f modern etymologies o f the 
kind that we know from Heidegger, and from 
Norberg-Schulz. I n hindsighr we can even see 
an anticipation of modern theories of autono-
mous syntax as developped by Hjelmslev and 
Chomsky. In architecture we have seen such 
theories experimentally adopted, for instance 
by Peter Eisenman in his Houses I—IX. 
When Wittgenstein enters the scene, we are 
still left w i t h the world as immediately experi-
enced - in one hand, and in the other we hold 
a mental language that is a closed and self suf-
ficient system; in Wittgenstein's terms a "logi-
cal image" of the world. It is important here to 
bear in mind that "logical image" is not an ico-
nical phenomenon. Being "logical", the image 
rather alludes to an indexical representation, 
which in its turn again refers back to the Stoic 
"Lekton". In his early work Wittgenstein tried 
to account for the reference between language 
and world by means of a concept he called "Ac-
curate symbolism". In his late work he aban-
doned this ambition and retreated into "lan-
guage games", claiming that "The limits of my 
language are the limits o f my world" . In the 
words o f Derrida: "There is nothing outside 
the text." 8 
A Modern Return of Semiotics 
I f language does not refer to anything else than 
language, i f A does not stand for B, what is 
then the meaning of meaning ? Per Aage Brandt 
has pinpointed this problem and coined the 
phrase "Ontogonic trauma" to describe its con-
sequences to modern thought 9 . Let us recapi-
tulate. 
In Aristotle's arrangement, FORM and MAT-
TER are indivisible. He even subjects the world 
to a telos - meaning that its constant process 
o f change evolves towards an optimal form. 
Herein is implied an ontogenesis as good as 
any. We can be sure that the something of 
which we believe to have understood some-
thing, is real. 
In Thomas Aquinas' arrangement it is ob-
vious how meaning and the presence of the 
world, RES, is provided for because he simply 
includes the Creator himself as a foundatory 
element of meaning. In this way any sign -
linguistic or general - discretely implies Ge-
nesis. I t is not enunciated, but i t is there in the 
sense that the thinker or enunciator is not 
obliged to question the actual existence of that 
which causes her experience — or her thought 
for that matter. O n the contrary, she is obliged 
not to question i t . I n return she is free to pur-
sue her experience or thought, in full confi-
dence that the Lord wi l l guarantee its realism. 
We have seen how Ockham separated lan-
guage from the world, and established nomi-
nalism — as opposed to realism. Consequently 
philosophy and theology were split. Belief and 
knowledge went apart, and we know the phi-
losophical anxiety about secure knowledge that 
succeded this separation. 
Due to this condition the various fields of 
our knowledge bifurcate increasingly nume-
rous and more specialised fields — all o f which 
are compelled to provide their own genesis. Un-
der these circumstances concepts can only be 
concepts of concepts. A t this point hermeneu-
tics is called in from theology. Knowledge can 
only be knowledge about itself. History can 
only be history o f history. "Anything goes". 
Eventually anything is as possible or impos-
sible as anything else because every individual 
is speaking from her own point o f view, from 
her own place, from her own universe and up-
on the basis of her own individual genesis. 
The most frequent indications of the syn-
drome are the following: 
- Ideas are presented and defended as i f they 
were territories in a political and geogra-
phical sense. 
- Research is carried out as i f it was a mission 
of conquest whose booty was to be brought 
home unshared. 
- Hypotheses become dogma which should 
be propagated, supported and consolidated 
rather than investigated. 
- Critique is delivered in the form o f perso-
nal offence, and perceived as an intrusion 
on private territory rather than an interes-
ted contribution to the i l lumination o f a 
problem. This effect increases dramatically 
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whenever the critique originates from an-
other discipline. 
- Methodology is used as criterion of validity 
instead of an insttument of work. The valid-
ity o f a dubious result can always be saved i f 
one is capable of customising the account-
ing for one's method. In that way any cr i t i -
que can be repudiated on the grounds that it 
does not concern one's particular field of stu-
dy; as i f everyone studies her own private 
world, as i f a proposition can be true in phi-
losophy even i f it is not i n physics, as i f i t 
was another force that made church towers 
collapse in the middle ages than in the ba-
roque. 
I n a world where ontopathy 1 0 spreads as oi l 
spills on water, where knowledge is herme-
neutically organised in emancipated and self-
referring systems, meaning and being reappear 
as problems. One is again urged to ask for an 
ontological basis for syntax, for the hidden 
structures or forms o f daily life. 
"Autonomous syntax" can be understood as 
syntax in a general sense, beyond language. We 
know it from the term siructur-alism, but then 
as a de-ontological entity. In an attempt to es-
tablish a new rational paradigm we see advan-
ces towards the establishment of ontological 
foundations for these structures. The efforts 
are multidisciplinary. They are based on the 
assumption that there are not x number of 
worlds, but one — which is common to all 
fields o f knowledge, and that this one wor ld 
" - should be understood in such a way that it 
is not absurd to think that it may have pro-
duced us". 1 1 This is a break w i t h traditional 
modernist views. I t is not only a break wi th the 
modernist conception of language, but also 
w i t h the kind of logic which produced the un-
derstanding o f language as "a logical image of 
the wor ld . " This structutal turn is a turn to-
wards a neo-Aristotelian understanding o f the 
world which reaches far beyond the realm o f 
linguistic sciences. 
A traditional modernist position has not 
only proven incapable of explaining why or 
how language does in fact function quite well 
in relation to the world, but it even seems to 
imply some kind of theological belief that this 
relation should not be explained. I t is as i f mo-
dernists thinkers nurture a deep anxiety that an 
eventual explanation of this k ind would de-
stabilise the entire cartography o f knowledge 
— which is in fact quite likely that it would. 
Such an explanation is consequently rejected 
as i f by ideological reflex. 
We could imagine that such a reflex is de-
veloped as a consequence o f the ontogonic la-
bour that man had to take on after he had 
abolished God. After all; as a logical conse-
quence man had to take on the role of being 
his own creator, and it is maybe understand-
able that he anxiously resists any attempt at 
explaining or even describing this extraordi-
nary phenomenon. Anti-logocentrism, anti-
rationalism, deconstructivism etc. - the examp-
les are abundant. 
I f language, or thought, did after all turn 
out to be explainable, or even describable, this 
might compel us to reconsider the modern con-
ception of freedom. A possible consequence 
o f this is a revocation of the question of what 
man is. One might be led to question one's 
privileged role in Creation - as a human being. 
One might eventually wind up as a specimen 
among other species, and even having to share 
intelligence, consciousness and — who knows 
— wi l l w i th other kinds of beings. 
Modern thought apparently finds itself fa-
cing a situation where it is necessary to issue a 
certain denkverbod1 in order to protect the free 
human w i l l against illegitimate knowledge — 
like in the middle ages - or to accept a recon-
sideration of the human condition. 
The Current State of Affairs 
I have run briefly through some important 
events on our way from the middle ages down 
to our contemporary late-modem position. 
Let me now - w i t h belated wisdom — summa-
rise some of the forms semiotics took on when 
it re-emerged after five centuries o f darkness 
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and Enlightenment, before I end these notes 
wi th an outline of the most central semiotic 
constructions, sign structures, that are cur-
rently at hand. 
A Cartography of Signification 
Kant set knowledge as a product of the human 
mind. He held it impossible to apprehend the 
world directly, without mediation, as Ockham 
demanded. The world had to be brought to us, 
but he did not leave apprehension exclusively 
in the care of subjective perception. He intro-
duced the a priori given truths as an under-
lying structure upon which human reason 
could rest. 
These structures are reflected in various ver-
sions in the semiotics which succeeded Kant. 
Common to all o f them however, is the subject 
- object problem in one form or another. 
Basically we can distinguish three traditions 
in modern semiotics - even i f one of them is 
rather anti-semiotic. Al l are, however, concerned 
w i t h meaning, and must therefore accept be-
ing considered as semiotics. To briefly outline 
these three: 
i) The Binary Sign 
Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913) is consider-
ed the founder of modern linguistics, and of 
French semiotics - often referred to as semio-
logy. He is the one who most explicitly took up 
a nominalist position — with all it implied. 
Saussure took little interest in the world out-
side language; even though he did touch on 
the problem of reference, his sign relation re-
mained basically the relationship between the 
signifier (Sa) - or the linguistic expression -
and the signified (Se) or the linguistic content. 
This sign became an arbitrary one. It provided 
a very weak and unstable relation between ex-
pression and content. O n the other hand it 
opened vertiginous possibilities o f intra l i n -
guistic analysis. It is hard to imagine the L i n -
guistic Turn and the textual strategies o f Der-
rida without Saussure. 
In the architectural field, interest in semio-
tics in the seventies concerned semiotics o f 
this origin, but due to its linguistic nature it 
was not very useful. Indirectly in the form o f 
textual strategies and deconstruction, how-
ever, the binary sign structure has had an i m -
mense impact upon architecture. W i t h respect 
to knowledge the effect was strongly negative. 
It was even used as some kind of academic legiti-
mation for theoretical ignorance. O n the other 
hand quite a few interesting methodologies 
such as various kinds of "readings", "mappings" 
and "layerings" were developed in its wake. 
SOME NOTES FOR A HISTORY OF MEANING 31 
The so called "Paris School" headed by Algir-
das Greimas, and later by Jean Petitot, has 
taken up bits and pieces of this tradition, ela-
borating and cross-breading them with other 
traditions during the last 30 years. Greimas 
developed a new generation of the binaty sign 
by combining it w i t h the classical "Logical 
Square". The resulting model, the Greimasean 
structuralist sign structure, is called Le Carré 
Sémiotique, the semiotic quadrangle. See fig. 8. 
Even i f this structure is more formally so-
phisticated, i t repeats the problem that the 
binary sign had in its relation to matter, to the 
world outside the text. As such the Greimasean 
efforts can be seen as a continuation of the 
work of the modists. 
A comparison of Ockham's nominalist con-
ception o f the languages to Saussurean and 
Greimasean sign structures would go like this: 
Sé 
CONCEPT 
ENUNCIATION 
Sé Sa 
EXPERIENCE • WORLD 
external 
language 
Sa language 
ENUNCIATION ^ CONCEPT 
EXPERIENCE ^ • WORLD 
— external -g^  
s é language 
Figure 9. The top figure is Ockham's inner and ex-
ternal languages arranged as Saussurean signs. 
The fig. underneath shows how the languages are 
distributed on the Carre Semiotique according to 
Greimas. 
contrary relation 
sub-contrary relation 
Figure 8. Le Carre Semiotique. 
Contrary relation is a relation of opposites; like 
(black: white) - to which the corresponding subcon-
trary relation would be (not-black: not-white), (black: 
not-black) would be a contradlctorial relation, and 
(black: not-white) is a complementary one. 
In Saussurean terms the external and the inner 
languages according to Ockham are both bi-
nary sign structures w i t h one expression-side 
and one content-side, one signifier and one 
signified. Analysed respectively as contrary and 
sub-contrary terms, the analysis renders them 
contradicting each other. A contradictorial re-
lation between concept and experience, bet-
ween external and inner language provides a 
feeble ground for realistic meaning. 
The other possibility of draping Ockham 
on Greimas is to consider the inner language as 
a signifier for the external language, in other 
words to consider ENUNCIATION a signifier 
for EXPERIENCE and CONCEPT as a signi-
fier for WORLD. See fig. 10. 
Now the two languages appear as contrari-
ties to each other, which may seem to be a 
reasonable relationship between them. How-
ever; the price is the internal structure of each 
language. The distinction between expression 
and content within the languages is lost. CON-
CEPT is reduced to an implication of ENUN-
CIATION, and WORLD is but a complement 
of EXPERIENCE. As a matter of fact this ana-
lysis reflects the antique Physistheory, as well as 
its modern successors. One might adopt Hei-
degger's dicta " D i e Sprache spricht" (the langu-
age speaks) and "Das Ding dingi' (the thing 
things) as expressions of inner and external 
language respectively. 
Sa Sé 
ENUNCIATION 
• \ 
EXPERIENCE 
y A 
T \ . 
inner language 
I / 
. external language 
\ 1 • 
nnwrFPT 
\ T 
WORLD 
Si Si 
Figure 10. 
ii) The Anti-Sign 
I f Saussure can be seen as one o f Derrick's 
grandfathers, Heidegger could be considered 
to be the other. When I call Heidegger in at 
this point however, i t is due to an other heir 
of his; Christian Norberg-Schulz. In his first 
book, Intentions in Architecture, he set out to 
analyse architecture as a manifestation of man's 
relation to the world around h im. Norberg-
Schulz esrablished a semiotic structure inten-
ded to construe architecture in terms of con-
cept, o f actual physical presence and of the 
user's perception of the two. However; he did 
not quite succeed in establishing the strong 
concept — world relationship he had set out 
for. For some strange reason he apparently did 
not read Peirce at the time when grappling 
w i t h these problems. I f he had done so, he 
would have found Peirce's INTERPPvETANT. 
From there on he might have been able to de-
velop his work according to its initial agenda. 
This is strange because at the time he was wor-
king at the M I T , and he had supposedly good 
contact w i t h people, like for instance Charles 
Morris, who definitely was fami-
liar wi th the works of Peirce. For 
whatever reason, Norberg-Schulz 
apparently put his semiotic agen-
da aside and turned to Heidegger 
instead. 1 3 
Norberg-Schulz located the problem o f mea-
ning to the question o f centre, which he later 
smoothly merged w i t h the concept of place. 
He called upon Archimedes misquoting h i m 
thus: "Give me a place to stand and I wi l l move 
the w o r l d . " 1 4 As wi th a stroke of magic Archi-
medes' lever was gone, and science w i t h i t . I n 
Norberg-Schulz' corrupted quotation the to-
pic is switched from a discussion of the pos-
sibilities and limitations o f science to a d i -
rect and unmediated manipulation o f the 
world. Archimedes is reduced from scientist to 
muscleman. 
Meaning is given a geographical being-in-
the-world, it is turned inro mute earth. The 
sign structure has imploded, and meaning 
territorialised. What would Norberg-Schulz's 
Archimedes do i f someone was already stan-
ding on his place ? 
Hi) The Dynamic Sign 
W i t h Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) the t r i -
angular sign structure reappears, but now as a 
general logical structure. Peirce is thoroughly 
presented elsewhere in this issue, so I wi l l make 
this outline very brief. 
Peirce actually merges phenomenology with 
logics and semiotics. As a matter o f fact he 
often refers to his semiotics as Phaneroscopy, 
which is Greek and means something like "ob-
servation of phenomena". He gives numerous 
definitions and elaborations of his sign rela-
tion and its elements throughout his very ex-
tensive authorship, but one of the shortest and 
most comprehensive definitions is quoted from 
Figure 1 1 . Das Gevierte, the Quad-
rant, after Heidegger in "Bauen, Woh-
nen, Denken". In capitals are Heideg-
ger's terms, in minuscles are the ad-
ditions of the author. 
HEAVEN 
general concept 
MORTALS 
man 
experience 
IMMORTALS 
_ God 
enunciation 
EARTH 
world 
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nominatio 
Figure 12. The Sign Relation according to Pelrce. Figure 13. Left: two stable conditions (-), with one un-
Text in capitals is Peirce's own concepts, in minus- stable (+) in the middle. Right: the threshold value, 
cles are cross references added by the author. 
his text "Logic as Semiotic" (printed elsewhere 
in this issue): "A sign, or representamen, is some-
thing which stands to somebody for some-
thing in some respect or capacity." His sign re-
lation is composed o f the fol lowing three 
basic elements: The Representamen /R/ or the 
sign, the Object IOI and the Interprétant III. 
The first element /R7, stands for that which is 
immediately experienced when one is exposed 
to something — "' aliquid\ The second element 
IOI is the actual object which is the cause of 
the first experience - "aliquo". The third ele-
ment III is a device of a sophisticated structural 
nature which enables us to relate aliquid'with 
aliquo. So far it may look like several previous 
sign relations, only now the third element is not 
GOD or the SUBJECT, but a an abstract struc-
tural device. The important difference is how-
ever, that unlike GOD, SUBJECT or MAT-
TER, the INTERPRETANT is not a source of 
meaning, but a dynamic force in the produc-
tion o f meaning. Consequently the vectors of 
the sign relation all point the same way. They 
do not meet at a source. (See fig. 12, and com-
pare to figures 1-6.) 
Finally, and in coherence wi th his dynamic 
conception o f meaning, Peirce includes the 
perceiving subject in meaning, and introduces 
habit, belief and pragmatics in the inventory 
o f scientific investigation. 
I would not dare calling René T h o m an heir 
to Peirce, although they both belong under the 
dynamic sign. Just like Catastrophe Theory 
(CT) itself is being accused o f committing 
scientific imperialism, it might be considered 
to be such imperialism, or at least taxonomic 
imprecision, to include CT among semiotic ap-
proaches. However; in the same way a contem-
porary semiotic must account for time and 
real-world phenomena in order to be in co-
herence wi th contemporary real-world know-
ledge, it must include a spatio-temporal phe-
nomenology in its repertory. 
Traditional science only takes interest in a 
phenomenon when i t is already there, whereas 
the particular interest of Catastrophe Theory 
is how discontinuity arises from continuity, 
how a flow of amorph MATTER can generate 
form and become phenomena. 
The name "Catastrophe Theory" is mislead-
ing. René T h o m developed the theory to the 
background of his mathematical studies in 
topology during the nineteen fifties. 
Stable conditions acting as attractors and 
unstable conditions acting as repulsors were 
familiar to topology. T h o m however, took a 
particular interest in the o-values, or the 
threshold-values were the condition lapsed 
from + to -. (See fig. 13). A t that time he called 
his theory " Cobordismé'', co-bord-isme. The 
"-bord-" does not refer to border, but to edge; 
to the edge between one condition and an 
other irrespective of the whether the condi-
tions in question unfold in ontology or de-
ontology or from CONCEPT to MATTER or 
- from concept to bui ld ing . 1 5 
The edge re-evokes the Aris-
totelian concept o f FORM; as 
indivisible from its matter. 
Thorn furthermore includes 
the temporal dimension of any 
phenomenon. This is illustra-
ted in figure 14 which shows 
the so-called "Phase Space" o f 
water, including the three con-
ditions o f H 2 0 : as steam, fluid 
and ice, as well as the thres-
holds between these condi-
tions. 
Thorn set out w i t h the notion that singula-
rities, or discontinuities, in other words FORM, 
occurs whenever a homogeneous, continuous 
(time-)space is exposed to confinement or out-
er pressure of any kind. Then MATTER wi l l 
fold, and generate a phenomenon. Abstract, 
but basic. What CT does according to Thorn, 
is to visualise, describe, and in some cases even 
explain morphogenetic processes as spatio-tem-
poral phenomena — on a general level. What 
CT does not do is to predict individual cases. 
CT deals wi th qualitative changes, but it does 
not quantify them. 
Finally; Architecture 
Therefore the artist (architect) must know 
the theory and master the skill. 
(Vitruvius on the education of an architect.) 
Coining the phrase "Semiosphere" 1 6 Jesper 
Hoffmeyer brings the Aristotelian concept of 
FORM to its logical conclusion. He suggests 
that meaning seems to be the basic unit o f 
nature. I n order to understand real-world, 
nature, we must understand i t in terms o f 
signification, like D N A etc. O n the basis o f 
this claim he sets out to study our history as 
a natural history o f the sign: — how does 
FORM arise from MATTER? - why is the world 
not a homogenous flow o f microscopic par-
ticles ? 
A piece of architecture, even the simplest 
one-family house, is only intelligible as a space-
water / 
1 atmosphere-
T " C l \ d D C Q A T I I Q C 
ice 
steam 
I f c M r t n A I U n t H 1 
0° 100° 
PRESSURE 
Figure 14. The Phase Space of water. 
time entity extending from concept to me-
mory, via design, construction, use and decay. 
What is then the nature o f architecture i f i t 
does not comprise o f physics and metaphy-
sics alike, or better: what is the nature o f ar-
chitecture i f it is not the ontological proto-
plasm from which both physics and meta-
physics are derived ? I guess we need to deve-
lop some solid theory o f meaning to handle 
such a plasma. 
Notes 
1. Umberto Eco, A Theory of Semiotics, Ind i -
ana University Press, Bloomington 1979. 
Pp. 58,59. See also "Sémiotique générale et 
philosophie de langage", Critique nr 452— 
453,1985. Published in Danish mAlmen Se-
miotiki, 1990. 
2. Karl Popper as quoted by Wil l iam H . Cal-
vin in Scientific American, Oct. 1994, p. 83. 
3. Aristotle's Metaphysics, 98^5. 
4. Jaques Le Goff elaborates on this in his De 
cultuur van middeleuws Europa ( The Cul-
ture of Middle Age Europe), p. 273. He men-
tions in particular the confrontation bet-
ween the French architect and the Lom-
bardian stone masons at the construction 
of the cathedral of Milan at the end of the 
fourteenth century. The architect claimed 
that there was no building technique w i t h -
out science, and the stone masons claimed 
that there was no science without techni-
que. 
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5. Cf. Logische Untersuchungen I, Edmund 
Husserl. 
6. E. g. Jean-Francois Bordron, 1990 & 1991. 
7. A theological principle meaning a "pr im-
ordial naming" o f which the bible guaran-
tees the authenticity o f the meaning. 
8. " I I n'y a pas de hors-texte", De la Gramma-
tologie, Jacques Derrida, Paris 1967. 
9. Per Aage Brandt, 1991. P. 61 ff. 
10. Ibid . 
11. Prigogine and Stengers in La Nouvelle Alli-
ance, 1979, here quoted from the Danish 
edition Den nye pagt mellem mennesket og 
universet, Forlaget Ask, Aarhus 1985, p. 364. 
12. Prohibition of thought. 
13. Neither Heidegger nor Peirce are mention-
ed anywhere in "Intentions 
14. Norberg-Schulz 1971, p. 19. 
In the essay "The Concept of Place" from 
1969 (published for the first time in Italian 
in Controspazio no. 1,1969, later in English 
in Architecture, Meaning and Place, New 
York 1988) Norberg-Schulz was still working 
w i t h /Place/ as a conceptual entity roughly 
equivalent to /Centre/. That was the first 
time he quoted Archimedes, but then he 
quoted h i m correctly. I t was only two years 
later, in 1971, when he turned /place/ into 
a material, physical entity, that Norberg-
Schulz deprived Archimedes o f his intel-
lectual capacities. 
15. The lapse from concept to building is o f 
course a point of particular interest to ar-
chitects. For an elaboration of this point, 
and for a further introduction to CT, see 
"The Effect of Butterfly upon an Opus of 
Architecture — A Catastrophe Theoretical 
perspective on Design Theory" by Ole Moy-
stad, Nordic Journal of Architectural Re-
searchNo 4,1993. 
16. Jesper Hoffmeyer 1993. 
All figures: © rrwystad 
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difference they offered me from Western thought 
while writing these notes. 
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